States and humanitarian crises
Under what circumstances do you think states should intervene in humanitarian crises?
There is no denying that human rights are nowadays part and parcel of international relations. The humanitarian crises in Iraq, Rwanda, Bosnia, or Kosovo have obviously shown that humanitarian intervention proves to be a controversial right. In this subject it is essential to analyse the current situation all over the world as far as respect of human rights is concerned. Needless to say that between western economic powers that are able to intervene in a foreign country and human rights norms-violating underprivileged countries there is a huge gap to bridge. This state of fact is due to the emergence of a new world order in which values like democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights were supposed to be top priorities. And the debate about the concept of humanitarian intervention is in a way a piece of evidence that international actors need clear definitions of both the notion of sovereignty and of a duty to set up humanitarian interventions. In fact, I am personally convinced that humanitarian intervention is based on a moral and ethical right. That is why I will try to show to what circumstances this obligation to protect human rights can apply. The first part of this essay will define the concept of sovereignty by highlighting its controversial nature. In a second part I will try to state the consequences that such a definition has on the political context of a humanitarian intervention. This will bring me thirdly to draw the line between real crisis, that is to say states of emergency, and situations that do not require humanitarian interventions.
What I want to show is the fact that states are from now on challenged by the emergence of new international norms. So we must wonder to what extent the values of a community should be respected or some universal values applied and enforced. I, for one, cannot help thinking that the authority of a state cannot solve all the problems that occur in its society. If a state could sort out all social and political problems, it would be logical to give it an almighty political authority. But this is wishful thinking! Of course the state has got what is called “the legitimate violence”, however the fact still remains that checks and balances are useful and above all necessary. The facts speak for themselves: what would be our world without the NGOs and especially the international human rights system’s opposition force? I would even go as far as to say that globalisation is more and more challenging the different states, insomuch as sovereignty of systems of state control is counterbalanced by these new human rights-promoting organisations. So we must not overlook the fact that the definition of sovereignty is absolutely not set in stone.
From my point of view the concept of sovereignty is linked with the duty to protect its own citizens. Thus the need to help peoples in distress would mean that everyone would have a duty to assist people in danger. With hindsight, the implication is that I will partly develop in this essay an ethical and moral point of view, for I am convinced that the opinion we can have on the circumstances under which state should intervene in humanitarian crises is relative to moral and ethical principles. Michael J. Smith has exposed two kinds of arguments about ethical issues in international relations.2 On the one hand, realists are in favour of a humanitarian intervention “only when their interests are really engaged”. On the other, liberals advocate both for an inalienable freedom and respect for principles of autonomy and sovereignty. To my mind ethics should be set above sovereignty. It is the only means to analyse with relevance the political context of a possible humanitarian intervention.
What do I call “the political context”? The political context is both the international system’s reaction to human rights abuses and its relationships with the human rights norms-violating state. Indeed, circumstances that make a humanitarian intervention necessary are dependent on the social and political situation in incriminated states, but they are also dependent on relationships these states have with external human rights-promoting actors. It seems to me that there are three scenarios: when the accused state does not intend to start up any conversation with the international authorities, when the accused state is both compelled to dialogue and reluctant to any kind of intervention, or when the state is resigned to a foreigner interfering. Each of these three different scenarios must entail an appropriate reaction. As a matter fact, the issues concerning intervention cannot be separated from the methods used to intervene.3
As far as the two first scenarios are concerned the use of military forces seems to me inevitable. Some people argue that the use of violence do not prove to be legitimate because it would simply come down to repeat violence, and so we would be caught in a vicious circle. I completely disagree with this viewpoint, because we must not forget the existence of what I call a moral imperative, that is to say that a state or political community willing to undertake a genuine humanitarian intervention should be prepared to risk the lives of its own soldiers to save the lives of those in the threatened community. Indeed, circumstances of humanitarian interventions are clear: issues at stake are sheer human lives. This reminds us my definition of sovereignty, namely the duty to protect human lives. So when human lives prove to be in danger, this state of fact make an external intervention primordial, even a military one. This, of course, does not mean that an intellectual tradition as important as military intervention for humanitarian purposes should not be retrieved and developed. Yet, all in all, military violence is sometimes the most effective means to cause the downfall of human rights norm-violating governments.
It should also be remembered that external interventions can be accepted by the state who is involved in human rights abuses. In this case we can talk about a process of international socialization.4 Thanks to an international pressure the state involved can recognize its duty as far as human rights are concerned. In this case cooperation with intervening states is really facilitated. What is the shape of such cooperation? It could be information, or even the help of the national military forces. What I would like to point out is that a humanitarian intervention is virtually seen as an interfering one. But why not consider that cooperation is sometimes possible? I have been extremely clear saying the national political authorities are responsible to their citizens internally. However states that are asking for an international help must be assisted as soon as possible; I think it is a moral imperative. So we have seen that accused states’ position towards other human rights-promoting states is essential if one want to make a relevant analysis of the political context of a possible humanitarian intervention. This brings us to another side of the question, namely social and political elements that make in concrete terms a humanitarian interfering absolutely necessary.
Let’s try now to answer the question that proves to be the crux of the matter here: in which cases is it necessary to intervene? For my part the answer is evident, in brief it is when a state does not ensure its responsibility to protect its own citizens. I include in concept of citizens’ political security their physical security, their economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity and worth as human beings, and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.5 First, under no circumstances can a government claim it is lawful to massacre its on population on the grounds that everything that goes on the country is an “internal matter”. All states should agree that they should respect fundamental rights, such as the right to life and respect for physical person. If states do not obey such moral imperatives, it is legitimate to be in favour of a humanitarian intervention. The western states’ military interventions in Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1994-95), Sierra Leone (1997), and in Kosovo (1999) remind us that in these states local populations were undergoing massacres or discriminatory and humiliating treatments.
I think we must draw a line between states’ interventions after a natural disaster and after a human rights norms violation committed by the accused state itself. After a natural disaster an external intervention could prove to be fundamental, insomuch as it would come down to save human lives. Nevertheless, needless to say it is delicate to intervene if the country in which the natural disaster occurred does not intend to ask for some external humanitarian help. As it were we can consider the state is the only one to be responsible for its own citizens, but on second thoughts most important of all is to help people in danger, even by resorting to force. As for certified human rights abuses I cannot help thinking interference is necessary and desirable. Quoting Gareth Evans, “when preventive measures fail to resolve or contain the situation and when a state is unable or unwilling to redress the situation, then interventionary measures by other members of the broader community of states may be required”. 6 States have absolutely to intervene in two cases: if there is large scale loss of life and also when there is large scale ethnic cleansing.
We may as well mention the fact that circumstances can call for anticipatory measures. From a moral and ethical stance, states belonging to the human rights international system cannot afford to wait until genocide begins before acting; it would be actually criminal. That is why I am convinced that deterrent interventions are sometimes as necessary as classical interferences. And what about situations of human rights violations like racial discrimination or political oppression, which ones do not happen to be killings or ethnic cleansings? I agree with people who are in favour of external actions (political, economic or military sanctions for example), but the fact still remains these cases do not seem to justify military actions. Indeed, this would be too extreme a position to advocate always for a military intervention. In this subject I would like to point out the human rights-promoting states’ huge responsibility. They have to make crucial choices, they have to decide under what circumstances they must implement a humanitarian intervention. And it is no exaggeration to say they just need moral sense to succeed in setting up human rights all over the world
To conclude let’s try to understand why it is necessary to have an ethical point of view to tackle the problem of humanitarian crises. In fact the problem is usually more political than legal, in the sense that what is needed is not new rules but the better use of existing ones.7 So the necessity of ethical and moral human rights-promoting norms do not prove to be debatable any longer. This brings me to another viewpoint, namely states should outshine their individual interests and fight double standards. Personally speaking, I have the feelings that ethics and moral principles are the only means to fulfil these objectives. Already at the very end of the cold war, the need was perceived to develop a new code of conduct, but after more than a decade international institutions have failed to do enough in this respect. As a consequence I approve people who support a “duty to protect”, because it permits us to adopt the only viewpoint ethically admissible. As a matter of fact, if we are unable or unwilling to provide a clear justification in response to the humanitarian need, it is no point trying to sort out humanitarian crises. To justify ethically an intervention abroad is all the more important that it help us to define the most serious human rights abuses, that is to say all behaviours that scoff at human dignity. Thus military interventions must not be pushed aside. We can catch Holzgrefe and Keohane’s definition of humanitarian intervention again: humanitarian intervention can be defined as “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied”. So, if ethically justified violence can be used without any hesitation; I am convinced that all is question of legitimacy. But finally who should have the right to stand for and to define precisely such a moral imperative? The question remains open. Let’s just hope there will be no more Rwanda before having found out a viable answer.
1 Ruth Diamint, Under what circumstances can external actors become effective partners to state to strengthen state capacity and enhance political independence? (www.un-globalsecurity.org), p.1
2 Michael J. Smith, Humanitarian Intervention: An Overview of the Ethical Issues, in Ethics and International Affairs: A reader, 1999, pp. 279-293
3 Daniel Archibugi, Cosmopolitan Guidelines for Humanitarian Intervention, for the Italian Research Council, 2002, p.16
4 Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkin, The socialization of international human rights norms: introduction, in The Power of Human Rights: international Norms and Domestic Change, 1999, p. 2
5 Gareth Evans, The responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention (www.crisisgroup.org/home/index. cfm?id=2561&I=1), 2004, p. 5
6 Gareth Evans, The responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention (www.crisisgroup.org/home/index. cfm?id=2561&I=1), 2004, p. 6
7 Olivier Corten, Humanitarian intervention: a controversial right (www.unesco.org/courier/1999_08/uk/ethique/txt1.htm), 1999, p. 3